Alek Westover and Nathan Sheffield would count AI-company computing toward a capabilities budget by default, exempting only specified uses that do not improve general model capabilities. Their November 17 essay on the Redwood Research blog proposes a definition for legislation or voluntary commitments intended to slow frontier AI development. It would allow companies to keep serving customers and doing some safety research while limiting the computing they spend making AI more capable.

The authors want a classification that slows progress even when companies try to evade it, and that experts can apply consistently. Counting everything would be simpler, they acknowledge. Exemptions would let companies spend their remaining resources on safety and preserve external access, which distributes information and power beyond the developers. They deliberately prefer counting some harmless work to exempting work that accelerates capabilities. A cap would restrict aggregate spending, so activities classified as capabilities work, including useful safety research, could continue within the allowance.

The proposal exempts idle computing only when a whole GPU does nothing for a meaningful period; leaving some cores underused would not qualify. Narrow product development could include integrating AI into Google Docs, protein-folding models, recommendation systems and advertising tools, provided the work does not improve general models or generate broadly useful algorithms. Training general models to do better mathematics or legal reasoning would count, as would coding scaffolds, robotics, and research or training for voice, image and video models.

Customer inference would usually be exempt, with three consequential exceptions. Companies could not outsource capabilities tasks to customers and keep the resulting computing outside their budget. If they trained on customer interactions or used them to evaluate and select model improvements, the inference that generated those interactions would count too. Customers doing central AI-development work, such as building reinforcement-learning environments, would consume the allowance even if they never sold the results back to the provider. Companies would have to use a robust classifier to identify such workloads, then refuse service or count them. For zero-data-retention workloads, they would have to refuse flagged use or presumptively count the computing. Most inference for a company's own employees would also count, with exceptions for nonresearch functions such as legal and human-resources work.

Westover and Sheffield allow six kinds of safety work: alignment evaluations, internal security, specified research, running monitors, running misuse classifiers, and investigating misalignment incidents. Alignment evaluations ask whether a model would behave badly; capabilities evaluations test what it can do. Even an alignment evaluation would count toward the budget if it demonstrated AI research and development capabilities. Dangerous-capability testing and evaluations of control systems would count as well.

The exempt research list is deliberately short. It covers interpretability without clear capability applications, research on how informative a model's written reasoning is, studies of model personas, selected deliberately misaligned test models, and theoretical alignment work without near-term capability applications. Companies seeking this exemption would have to publish a project plan at the outset and detailed findings at the end. Model-persona work would qualify when it changes a model's dispositions and intended behavior. Work with deliberately misaligned models could not investigate new algorithms, even at small scale. Studying how easily a novel architecture could be monitored would therefore count if developing it required techniques that might improve capabilities.

The authors distinguish running a safeguard from using it to select better training methods. A monitor that detects and blocks bad behavior could be exempt. Training that monitor would count, as would testing several training changes against its scores and retaining the best. The same restriction applies to misuse and jailbreak classifiers. Improving reward models, training resistance to jailbreaks, and repairing weaknesses in reinforcement-learning environments would all count because they can improve the signals used to train a more capable system.

Security work receives similar treatment. Patching vulnerabilities in company infrastructure could be exempt. Testing several model configurations on cyber tasks and developing the best performers would remain capabilities work even if a company described it as security testing. External security projects, such as repairing the Linux kernel, should be delegated to outside parties. The company could subsidize access to its models, but could not strongly direct the work or use its results to evaluate model improvements while claiming the exemption.

Ambiguous activities would count until the definition changed. A company could describe a workload and seek a revision; independent auditors would check how the categories were applied. The authors anticipate revisions when companies exploit loopholes or when AI research changes. If distinguishing exempt safety or product work proved impractical, they would remove one or both exemptions.

The essay builds on the July Pacing the Frontier statement, signed by 1,386 employees of frontier AI companies, which asked the US government to support international efforts to develop tools for slowing automated AI development. It also cites Eli Lifland's November 10 proposal for independently verified compute-allocation disclosures. Lifland argues that auditors must check both declared workloads and whether companies have hidden computing outside their view. Redwood's classification would give those auditors a common set of categories.

Westover and Sheffield credit Anthropic's compute-allocation disclosure as a useful start. Anthropic estimated that safety received about 6% of its AI-research computing during July 13–20. It published a short definition and an excerpt of its fuller classification instructions, with independent verification still planned. Its categories also differ from Redwood's: Anthropic excluded safeguard classifiers from the safety measure and counted product development as AI research. Redwood would exempt running misuse classifiers and qualifying narrow product work. The authors want developers to let outside auditors measure and publicly report allocations using a shared definition, so that any future cap constrains comparable activities across companies.