Copying a digital person creates a conflict among principles for assigning certain rights, even if the person's consciousness is established, Jack Carson argues in Rights are for Those Who Remain One: The Hard Problem of Branching for Recognitional Incidents. Carson, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, published the paper in Minds and Machines on November 6. He stipulates that Alpha is sentient and a full moral person, with one vote in tomorrow's election. Tonight Alpha splits into Beta and Gamma, each equally continuous with Alpha in memory and character. If both inherit the vote, copying has multiplied the entitlement. If neither inherits it, the entitlement disappears despite the survival of two complete successors. If only one inherits it, neither copy has a better claim.
Carson names three principles that conflict in this case. Nonproliferation prohibits multiplying an exclusive entitlement through copying. Preservation requires that the entitlement survive the split. Non-Arbitrariness requires a justification for choosing its holder grounded in facts about the person, such as continuity, authorship or desert. His proof is brief: the first two principles require exactly one successor to hold the entitlement, while the third requires successors who are indistinguishable in these respects to receive the same outcome. With two or more successors, either all hold it or none do. No allocation rule satisfies all three conditions; each of his policy options gives one up.
The proof concerns what Carson calls DIME incidents: legal positions that persist over time, cannot be divided without changing their character, require a determinate holder and exclude simultaneous holders. His examples include a person's vote, exclusive title to a parcel of land, standing to sue and criminal liability. He further restricts the argument to recognitional incidents, where assignment answers to facts about the person. A conviction, for example, can identify the wrong defendant. Conventional statuses, such as a corporate office, are constituted by rules. Carson's criminal-liability argument assumes retributive punishment, directed at the wrongdoer because they deserve it. The proof concerns inherited entitlements under these conditions; it permits successors to acquire rights independently.
Carson argues that a lottery cannot satisfy his demand for recognition. It can fairly allocate an organ or a school place among competing claimants, but choosing between equally continuous successors does not establish which one committed Alpha's crime. He also challenges Joel Leibo and colleagues' arXiv paper A Pragmatic View of AI Personhood, which treats personhood as rights and responsibilities that societies can separate and confer piecemeal. Separating incidents still leaves each needing a holder after fission, Carson replies. He interprets their proposed registrars and sanction registries as assigning identity by convention. Against the broader view that legal identity is entirely constituted by rules, he argues that stipulations such as adulthood thresholds govern boundary cases. He acknowledges that rejecting the distinction between recognition and convention would dissolve the trilemma on its stated terms.
Carson's Path 1 abandons Non-Arbitrariness: a registrar designates one copy as the holder of Alpha's incidents. Available mechanisms include certificates tied to hardware, remote attestation, succession plans and public records of revocation. Guaranteeing a single live instance, he argues, may require severe limits on copying, backups, saving and loading, or transmission. He also asks how the regime treats unregistered copies. Denying their personhood withholds rights from a mind for administrative convenience; recognizing them as new persons introduces elements of Path 3. Carson classifies the Algorithmic Corporation proposed in Yonathan Arbel, Peter Salib and Simon Goldstein's arXiv paper How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents under Path 1: a legal entity owned by humans and operated by AIs would provide an institutionally defined identity.
Path 2 abandons Nonproliferation and governs the successors collectively as a lineage. Carson distinguishes multiplying their claims from coordinating how those claims are exercised. A trustee can manage shared property while presenting outsiders with one authorized decision-maker. Voting presents a harder choice: one collective vote gives each successor less influence as the lineage grows, while separate votes allow political power to grow with copying. Carson also objects to punishing the lineage for Alpha's crime because its members did not exist when the act occurred. He acknowledges that this objection depends on treating authorship as requiring personal identity; psychological continuity could support a different account of responsibility.
Path 3 abandons Preservation: Alpha's incidents lapse when Alpha divides, as they would at death. Alpha's voter registration ends, and Beta and Gamma register independently. Property passes under inheritance rules, a will or a trust. Carson worries that a defendant could thereby escape punishment. He proposes presuming an intention to evade liability when fission occurs during prosecution, soon after a civil judgment or when liability is foreseeable. The successors would have to produce evidence rebutting that presumption. He also considers reversing evasive fission by analogy with fraudulent transfers and imposing civil remedies against successors' property. These measures, he says, do not restore retributive punishment. Nor is lapse costless for safety: an agent anticipating the loss of its rights might resist safety processes that risk fission.
Carson allows that substantial differences between successors can justify choosing one. A running copy may have continued Alpha's projects while a backup remained dormant for months; another copy might suffer severe amnesia. His additional Continuity Constraint says that small differences relevant to personhood cannot justify large differences in legal status. Activation a millisecond earlier, a different process identifier or a different server location does not establish greater psychological continuity. An advance declaration naming a successor likewise creates a legal distinction without settling identity: both successors remember making it and can claim equal authority to rescind it. Such declarations can still distribute property conventionally after Alpha's incidents lapse.
Carson's discussion of personal identity qualifies how these options apply. On his reading of Derek Parfit, successors might deserve punishment in proportion to their psychological connectedness to Alpha even if neither is numerically identical to Alpha. David Lewis's account instead treats the successors as distinct persons who already shared Alpha's life before dividing. That challenges the proof's starting assumption of one bearer. Carson argues that institutions would struggle to count such persons, but the mathematical result itself does not settle which account of personal identity to accept.
Earlier writers had already identified conflicts between copying and political equality. In The Full Rights Dilemma for A.I. Systems of Debatable Personhood, a 2023 paper, Eric Schwitzgebel asks how voting should accommodate an entity that divides and merges. Separate votes invite tactical division; sharing one vote disadvantages copies pursuing independent lives. Carl Shulman and Nick Bostrom's 2020 draft of Sharing the World with Digital Minds considers requiring someone who creates duplicates to divide their voting power among them, resembling the shared-vote version of Carson's Path 2. In a June 2026 post, Schwitzgebel considers waiting periods before copies can vote and restrictions on copying, while explaining the problems each leaves. Carson develops these questions into a formal conflict among three principles and a detailed comparison of institutional responses.
Carson also cites Ned Howells-Whitaker and Seth Lazar's arXiv paper Artificial Persons, which approaches personhood through Rawls's capacities for a sense of justice and a conception of the good. They argue that these capacities need not require sentience and ask how many votes a person capable of copying and merging should receive. Lazar runs the MINT lab, which publishes this newsletter. Carson's argument adds that resolving the grounds of moral status would leave the inheritance of existing legal positions unsettled.
Carson endorses no single policy for every incident. He encourages different treatments for different rights and liabilities: restricting copying to maintain assigned identities, governing successors jointly, or ending inherited incidents while admitting successors as new rights-holders. His broader conclusion is that routinely copyable persons cannot receive recognitional rights on the familiar model. The proof establishes the conflict among his three conditions; that broader conclusion depends on accepting his account of which rights require recognition and what recognition demands.